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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Lebanon’s mine/Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) contamination problem stems from 
more than 40 years of intermittent conflict involving neighbouring Israel and Syria as well as 
various non-state armed groups. With the brunt of the contamination in the country’s 
southern provinces, mine action in Lebanon was mostly concentrated in the south.  
 
Lebanon began addressing its contamination problem internally in 1998 through the 
creation of the National Demining Office (NDO). The NDO was responsible for establishing a 
national database, an annual work plan and an emergency response capacity. It was also in 
charge of developing a strategic integrated national mine action plan, with the aim of 
clearing mined areas and reducing risk through risk education (RE). It was only in 2000, 
however, when Israel withdrew its forces from south Lebanon, that mine action in the 
country became internationally recognized. That year, the United Nations Mine Action 
Service (UNMAS) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) set up the 
Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC). With the UN in charge of the operational 
management of mine action, NDO became exclusively responsible RE and victim assistance 
(VA) and overall coordination. 
 
In 2002, the Lebanese Government signed an agreement with the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), which created Operation Emirates Solidarity (OES), a 2-year, USD 50 million project 
to clear mines and ERW in the formerly Israeli occupied areas in south Lebanon. Under the 
OES, the MACC was expanded into a tripartite structure composed of the UN, the Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF) and the UAE. Under this new structure, the MACC changed its name to 
MACC South Lebanon or MACC SL. 
 
Although the NDO, which became the Lebanon Mine Action Centre (LMAC) in 2007, 
remained the official mine action authority, with strategic and coordinating responsibilities, 
MACC SL was indeed the operational arm of mine action in Lebanon. Hence, the actual 
transition that occurred in January 2009 was more a logistical transfer of responsibilities 
from the UN component of the MACC SL (UNMACC) to the LMAC, giving LMAC full strategic, 
coordination and operational control over mine action in south Lebanon. However, there 
seems to be no precise and unanimous agreement on how to characterise what actually 
occurred in January 2009 between UNMACC and the LMAC. Within the Lebanese mine 
action community, the term “transition” is used interchangeably with “handover”, “hand 
back” and “exit” in documents and discussions. One non-governmental organisation (NGO) 
director in Lebanon characterised the change in management as an exit by the UN rather 
than a transition to national ownership, eliciting the assumption that Lebanese authorities 
were in charge the whole time. And while LMAC has referred it to as “resuming 
responsibility,” one RMAC officer viewed it solely as a logistical operation: “It was like 
moving your house. You packed the furniture and re-located.” 
 
Regardless of how the transition is understood, the UN continues to play a role, albeit much 
more limited, in mine action in Lebanon, mainly through a capacity development project. 
Led by UNDP, the project is currently in its second phase. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Lebanon is located in the Middle East, with an area of 10, 452 bordering Syria, Israel and 
the Mediterranean Sea. The estimated population in 2011 was of 4.1 million people, 
with almost half living in the capital, Beirut. Lebanon is a high-middle-income country 
which has experienced notable economic and social progress, with its economy growing 
at an annual average rate of eight per cent since 2006 and average GDP per capita of 
USD 6,500 in 2008.
1
 However, poverty remains a problem, as eight per cent of the 
population still lives in extreme poverty and 28.5 per cent lives below the upper poverty 
line, which translates into only USD 4 per capita per day.
2
 
 
Lebanon’s mine /ERW contamination is a legacy of more than 40 years of intermittent 
conflict, which involved neighbouring countries and various non-state armed groups. 
The July – August 2006 invasion by Israel is the most recent conflict and it resulted in 
heavy contamination of cluster submunitions in the south.
3  
 
The Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) conducted by the Mines Advisory Group (MAG) 
between March 2002 and August 2003 identified 306 mine-impacted communities 
containing 933 distinct mine/ERW contaminated sites. The contamination spanned an 
estimated 137 square kilometres of land, directly affecting the livelihoods and safety of 
more than one million people. The LIS also found that apart from Mount Lebanon, most 
of the contamination was in the country’s southern provinces, with the latter also 
suffering the highest casualty rates. 
 
And despite progress, socio-economic development in Lebanon continues to be affected 
by mine/ERW contamination, which has hindered the execution of a major drinking and 
irrigation water pipeline projects and impeded the use of most agricultural land in the 
south. 
 
 
                                                    
1
 World Bank, Lebanon; 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/LEBANONEXTN/0,,menuPK:294911~pagePK:14
1132~piPK:141121~theSitePK:294904,00.html. 
2
 UNDP, “Fast Facts: Lebanon,” United Nations Development Programme, 2011: 
http://www.undp.org.lb/FastFactSheets/Poverty_social.pdf 
3
 UN, “2009 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” November 2008, New York, p. 235. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME4 
 
PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT 
The Lebanese Mine Action Authority (LMAA), an interministerial body established in 
1998 by the Council of Ministers, is chaired by the Minister of Defense. The LMAA is 
responsible for the Lebanon national mine action programme.
5
 The 2007 National Mine 
Action Policy outlines the structure, roles and responsibilities of the mine action 
programme in Lebanon. LMAC, a part of the LAF, has the overall responsibility for the 
management and implementation of the mine action policy and strategy, including the 
coordination of risk education and victim assistance.  
The LMAC structure consists of: 
• the director 
• an assistant 
• a secretary 
• a security officer 
• the UNDP chief technical advisor  
• seven sections:  
o operations 
o quality assurance/quality control 
o information technology 
o media mine risk education with a steering committee 
o mine victims assistance with a steering committee 
o admin logistics  
o a regional mine action centre in Nabatieh 
 
When the Council of Ministers created the national mine action programme in 1998, it 
mandated that a database be created. The LMAC information management section is 
responsible for the management of mine action data. Its database, using IMSMA 
software, includes data from the 2002–2003 LIS, results from the technical survey 
project, and clearance operations after the July-August 2006 hostilities. RE activities and 
casualty data are also recorded in IMSMA. LMAC planned to upgrade to IMSMA new 
generation in 2011.  
                                                    
4
 The Lebanon mine action programme from 2000-2008 is well documented. This case-study utilised annual reports 
from the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC-SL)
4
, LMAC strategy and implementation documents, 
memorandums of understanding between MACC-SL and LMAC, funding proposals and the final Operation Emirates 
Solidarity report from 2004. Interviews in Lebanon with LMAC, RMAC, UNDP, UNMACC, Mines Advisory Group 
(MAG), DanChurchAid (DCA), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) and DynCorp International took place from 24 -31 August 
2010. At the time of this study in August 2010, only a few people remained with UNMACC, UNDP, and the NGOs in 
Lebanon that were there during the transition in January 2009.  
5
 LMAC, “Mine Action in Lebanon: Mine Action Structure,” www.lebmac.org. 
 3 
 
 
The position of head of information technology and information management at LMAC 
is a civilian position funded through the UNDP capacity development project. The IT and 
information management section produces reports, analysis and maps information for 
planning. The GIS department of the Ministry of Defense also provides maps to LMAC. 
 
The Lebanon mine action programme is defined by the period when the Israelis 
withdrew from south Lebanon in May 2000 after an 18-year occupation, leaving behind 
approximately 400,000 landmines, and after the July-August 2006 invation by Israel, 
when approximately four million cluster submunitions were dropped on south Lebanon.  
 
National ownership has never been in doubt. According to the director of the LMAC, the 
mine action programme in Lebanon has been nationally owned since its inception in 
1998, when the government created the NDO and gave it complete responsibility for 
clearing all mines, reducing risk and coordinating victim assistance.  
 
On practical grounds, the transition of operational control from UNMACC to LMAC was 
more of a change in management, including adapting to a more military command-and-
control style of management, than any change in policies and procedures that might 
have impacted clearance operations. For NGOs, the change since January 2009 is that 
RMAC issues task orders and conducts quality assurance, rather than MACC SL. 
UNMACC in Tyre relocated to Naqoura and assumed a lesser but still important role in 
coordinating clearance operations with United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
(UNIFIL) troops.
6
 
 
One significant difference in the mine action programme since the transition in January 
2009 is the frequency in reporting on achievements and the remaining problems. From 
2006-2008, the MACC SL produced monthly and annual reports, funding updates and 
analysis, and managed a website (www.maccsl.org).  The website is no longer 
operational, though its reports are still available at www.mineaction.org.  Reporting on 
the mine action programme since January 2009 has been reduced to presentations at 
international meetings, related to the Anti Personnel Mine Ban Convention and the 
Convention on Cluster Munition. While LMAC operates its own website, it was not up-
to-date as of August 2010 and contained no current data or detail comparable with 
what was available in the MACC SL reports. This lack of regular reporting, combined 
with LMAC’s tight control over data, is a weak point in the post-transition period.  
 
Several factors have influenced the role the LMAC has had on operations in south 
Lebanon:  
 
                                                    
6
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of National Defense and the United Nations Mine Action 
Service, 13 October  
2010.  
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• the UNIFIL mandate 
• Operation Emirates Solidarity 
• the July–August 2006 hostilities 
• limited resources within the Ministry of Defense 
• the presence of  commercial and NGO mine/ERW operators 
• the UNMACC capacity development programme 
 
The MACC SL was a joint structure consisting of LAF officers from the LMAC, military 
officers from the UAE and personnel from UNMAS.  The MACC SL area of responsibility 
was from the Awali river in Saida in south Lebanon, down to and including the Blue Line 
bordering Israel.  The LMAC delegated all mine action coordination authority to the 
MACC SL within this part of the country.
7
  
 
The MACC SL was responsible for operational planning, tasking, quality assurance and 
coordination in south Lebanon, with the LAF officers of the MACC SL playing an integral 
part in management and coordination.  All decisions were made jointly between the LAF 
and the UN components of the MACC SL. The LMAC was responsible for all other areas 
north of the Awali river. 
 
HISTORY OF THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME8 
 
The Lebanon mine action programme can be divided into three phases.  
 
1. The first phase (1975-2000) was defined by the civil war, when landmines were 
laid throughout Lebanese territory, and the creating of the NDO in 1998.  
2. The second phase (2000-mid 2006) included the withdrawal of Israel from south 
Lebanon, the deployment of UNIFIL, the creation of UNMACC, and the 
establishment of MACC SL under the auspices of the OES project.  
3. The third phase (mid 2006-present) was characterised by the July 2006 Israeli 
attack, which contaminated south Lebanon with more than four million cluster 
munitions, the transfer of authority from the National Demining Office (NDO) to 
LMAC, and the adoption, after 2007 of the long term plan for 2008-2012.  
 
Each phase is detailed below. 
THE FIRST PHASE: 1975-1990 
 
The first phase is the 1975-1990 civil war, when landmines were laid throughout the 
country, particularly along the UN-delineated Blue Line between Lebanon and Israel in 
                                                    
7
 Letter from Brig.-General Mohammed Fehmi to UNMAS, 7 May 2007. 
8
 This section is based on UNMACC Annual Reports 2001-2008, www.mineaction.org; End State Strategy and Long 
Term Plan 2008-2012; http://www.lebmac.org and the Operation Emirates Solidarity Final Report Phase 1-3, 2004. 
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the south, in areas north of the Litani river, in the Bekaa valley, and on Mount Lebanon. 
The Engineer Regiment of the Lebanese Armed Forces conducted clearance operations, 
but not to international standards.  
 
In April 1998, the Council of Ministers passed Resolution No. 29 and created a mine 
action programme framework, consisting of the Ministry of Defense as the national 
mine action authority, the army-led NDO and the Lebanese Army Engineer Regiment. 
The Resolution required the NDO to establish a national database, an annual work plan 
and an emergency response capacity. The NDO also established steering committees to 
coordinate RE  and VA activities. The NDO was also tasked to develop a strategic 
integrated national mine action plan, with the aim of clearing mined areas and reducing 
risk through RE. 
THE SECOND PHASE: 2000-MID 2006 
 
The second phase began in 2000, when Israel withdrew from south Lebanon after an 
18-year occupation, leaving behind approximately 400,000 landmines. The 2001 UN 
Security Council Resolution 1337
9
 authorised the UNIFIL peacekeeping operation, which 
had been in Lebanon since 1978, to conduct mine clearance operations in south 
Lebanon.  
 
“…[T]he contribution of UNIFIL to operational demining, encourages further assistance in 
mine action by the United Nations to the Government of Lebanon in support of both the 
continued development of its national mine action capacity and emergency demining 
activities in the south, and calls on donor countries to support these efforts through 
financial and in-kind contributions…”  
 
In 2000, an UNMAS assessment recommended an emergency international rapid 
response in the south, because tensions with Israel prevented the LAF from becoming 
operational in this part of the country (the LAF Engineer Regiment of deminers operated 
only in north Lebanon). The expected return of tens of thousands of displaced people 
could have resulted in numerous accidents and casualties. UNIFIL requested UNMAS to 
establish a mine action coordination cell to assist in demining south of the Litani river, 
an area of approximately 700 square kilometres. 
 
The UN strategy for assistance to Lebanon was to accelerate mine action operations and 
to assist the Lebanese government in strengthening its capacity in all areas of mine 
action. The strategy included using all UN sources available in Lebanon at the time, 
including UNIFIL, UNICEF, UNMAS and UNDP, to implement a capacity development 
programme that would strengthen the NDO.  
                                                    
9
 UN Security Council Resolution 1337, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/231/38/PDF/N0123138.pdf?OpenElement 
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Based on interviews and desk research, it is apparent that in 2000, the Lebanese army 
and the Engineer Regiment lacked the human resources needed to manage the 
operational side of a mine action programme of the scale required to tackle the 
landmine contamination.  
 
In recognition of the role and status of the LAF in mine action, and foreseeing the 
inevitable closure of the MACC SL, LAF army officers and other personnel were 
embedded into the MACC SL in Tyre under the OES project. This was based on the 
assumption that the skills acquired under UN mentoring and guidance would be 
applied, once the LMAC took full control of the operations in south Lebanon. 
 
“A memorandum of understanding” between the government of Lebanon and the UAE 
mandated UNMAS to establish a mine action coordination centre in south Lebanon in 
Tyre, in order to plan, coordinate and monitor the OES project. UNMAS, through the 
UNMACC, used data from UNIFIL demining teams, NDO assessments and maps and 
records provided by the Israeli army, to develop the humanitarian demining 
programme.
10
  Although the NDO (later the LMAC), was the mine action authority, and 
though the Army Engineer Regiment had been clearing mines for many years and 
coordinating national NGOs in RE, it had limited resources to undertake a project as 
large as OES . 
 
The role of LMAC in the project was to ensure national policy and directives were 
followed. The LMAC contingent included the following from the LAF: 
 
• one project manager 
• one chief of operations 
• one planning officer 
• four quality assurance officers 
• one officer to work in the IMSMA database unit  
• eight soldiers, assigned as “assistants”  
 
Through on-the-job training, LAF officers gained experience in planning, task 
assessment and monitoring.
11
  
 
The memorandum of understanding between the governments of the UAE and Lebanon 
defined the official role of NDO as: 
 
• a facilitator in obtaining radio frequencies and office space 
                                                    
10
 UNMACC, “Annual Report 2007,” 3 March 2008, p. 3. The Blue Line is the area lying along the southern border of 
Lebanon, between Echo Road and the southern border between Lebanon and Occupied Palestinian Territories and 
Israel. Operation Emirates Solidarity Final Report 2004 Phase 1-3. 
11
 UNMACC, “OES Final Report Phase 1-3,” May 2002-May 2004. 
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• coordinating protection  
• importing and re-exporting explosives 
• providing information on mined areas  
• ensuring visas for international staff to ensure the project ran smoothly  
 
The NDO had little real responsibility or decision making power.
12
  
 
The LAF officers were tasked with conducting technical surveys and quality assurance. 
The OES project also included international commercial demining companies and 
deminers from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and the UAE. No nationals were recruited as 
deminers, because it was considered too time consuming and unreliable to hire and 
train them.  
 
While MACC SL was implementing the OES project, the NDO and the UNDP ‘Capacity 
Building for Mine Action Centre’ project launched a mine action strategic review in 
2003. It identified the need for policy development, national standards, strategies, work 
plans and documentation, including regular reporting, which resulted in the End-State 
Strategy for Mine Action in Lebanon (ESS) in 2004. The ESS contains the assumptions for 
mine action planning, based on LIS data, and the desired description of Lebanon at the 
end of clearance operations.
13
  
The ESS assumed that Lebanon, like other countries that have experienced war, was 
unlikely to become completely free of mines. In support of this critical assumption, it 
sought to create a national capacity to deal with residual contamination after the mine 
action programme had been formally completed. The “demining end-state condition” 
was stated as one in which “all known dangerous areas, where there is substantial 
threat to life and limb or which hinder socio-economic development, are demined to a 
level that is “as low as reasonably acceptable” (ALARA), according to national laws and 
standards, and international mine action standards (IMAS).”
14
 The ESS also identified 
the need for: 
• an effective explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity to map cleared or 
marked dangerous areas 
• coordination between mine/UXO awareness and demining.
  
It contained 12 guidelines for implementation:  
 
                                                    
12
 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United Arab Emirates and the Lebanese Republic 
Concerning the Contribution of the United Arab Emirates to Mine Clearance in Lebanon 
13
 NDO, “End State Strategy (ESS) for Mine Action in Lebanon,” March 2005, pp. 1–4. 
14
 ALARA is an acronym for the phrase “as low as reasonably achievable”. It is a principle often used in reducing 
exposure to chemicals whereby in an ideal world, one could reduce exposure to hazardous materials, such as 
landmines or cluster submunitions to zero but in reality, social, technical, economic, practical, or public policy 
considerations could result in a small but acceptable level of risk. www.ilpi.com/msds/ref/alara.html 
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Guidelines in the E-S S on Implementing Mine Action 
1. Apply national mine action priorities 
2. Continue use of IMAS and maintaining support to international mine action 
3. Use all mine information data – Lebanon LIS and IMSMA database 
4. Support socio-economic development plans 
5. Continue, and accelerate resource mobilisation 
6. Use programme and project management principles and capacity development, through 
national staff training and human skills development 
7. Implement mine\UXO Survey, verification, area reduction and marking on a priority 
basis 
8. Establish cost controls and operating principles that get maximum value for the money 
9. Provide for sustainability 
10. Obtain international technical advice, as needed 
11. Employ civilian national subject matter experts (SME) in the mine action programme 
12. Communication in both English and Arabic is essential 
 
Subsequently, LMAC produced annual work plans and a long term plan for 2005-2009, 
to remove the impact of mines and UXO in all high and medium priority areas by the 
end of 2009 through: 
• survey 
• clearance 
• area reduction 
• marking  
• fencing 
According to the ESS, Lebanon would be free from the impact of mines within 10 - 15 
years of the start of this plan, or sometime between 2015 and 2019.
 
 
In 2005, the NDO saw overall coordination of the mine action programme as its primary 
function in order to meet the goals of the ESS. The Ministry of Defense and the LAF 
made all policy decisions, with input from the NDO director. The NDO coordinated all 
organisations and projects executed as part of the Lebanon mine action programme.  
 
The 2005 national plan indicates that the NDO struggled with this role. The plan 
describes in considerable detail the difference between managing a programme and a 
project. According to NDO, the Lebanon mine action programme fit the definition of a 
“programme” because it was: 
 
• large 
• complex 
 9 
 
• maintained an office 
• was geographically dispersed 
• used contractors to provide services 
• assumed an end state  
• was visible to the public  
 
In contrast, a “project” was temporary, with very specific goals, such as OES, with MACC 
SL responsible for operational control, MRE or a LIS.  
 
Despite the NDO’s lack of control in operations in south Lebanon, by 2005 through OES, 
UNIFIL, international commercial companies and  MAG, 5.9 square kilometres of cleared 
land had been released for use, and the number of annual casualties had decreased 
from more than 90 in 2001 to 14 in 2004.
15
  
THE THIRD PHASE: MID-2006-PRESENT 
 
With the goals of the ESS closer to being achieved, Lebanon made preparations to 
submit a proposal as part of the UNDP Completion Initiative
16
, to clear all high and 
medium impact  minefields by 2010, excluding the mined areas along the Blue Line, and 
to develop a residual capacity to respond to the remaining contamination.  
In mid-2006, an impact-free state with a residual problem seemed achievable in just a 
few years. Ongoing technical surveys would further reduce the area to be cleared and 
lower the cost of clearing the remaining mined areas.
 
The planning and optimism came 
to an abrupt end in July 2006 when Israel attacked Lebanon, and in a one month period, 
fired over four million cluster munitions into south Lebanon. With cluster sub-munition 
contamination, Lebanon entered the third phase in its history of landmines/ERW.  
After hostilities stopped in mid-August 2006, south Lebanon faced a humanitarian crisis. 
Streets, farms, schools and homes were littered with sub-munitions, and there were 
approximately one million internally displaced persons. Throughout the war, the UN 
programme manager and the UN chief of operations for the MACC SL had remained in 
Tyre, making preparations and planning for the eventual end to the fighting and the 
enormous clearance task that would ensue. Immediately after the fighting ended, the 
Lebanese army engineers conducted initial clearance operations, as they were the only 
clearance capacity in the country at the time.  
                                                    
15
 NDO, “Integrated Work Plan for Mine Action in Lebanon 2005 (co-produced through the UNDP Capacity Building 
for Mine Action Assistance Project). 
16
 Eligibility was roughly based on being able to clear all remaining mine areas within 3-5 years for USD 10 million or 
less. 
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LMAC records indicate the Engineer Regiment found and cleared nearly 100,000 sub-
munitions in just a few months, a quantity representing over 50 per cent of all cluster 
sub-munitions found as of July 2010. The MACC SL became the operational hub for the 
rapid response. In its 2007 annual report, the MACC SL described its mission as being 
“responsible for ensuring the protection of the local civilian population living in south 
Lebanon and Area 6.”
17
 LMAC did not issue its own reports for 2006-2008. 
Donors responded to the post-July-August 2006 emergency. From September 2006 to 
December 2008, the MACC SL was able to accredit 60 battle area clearance (BAC) 
teams, eight EOD teams, 14 manual demining teams, six mechanical teams, and two 
mine detection dog (MDD) teams. Together they employed 1,070 national and 246 
international staff, comprising NGOs, commercial demining companies and 
peacekeepers. At the same time, UNIFIL increased its demining and EOD capacities 
following UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which allowed UNIFIL to contribute to 
the humanitarian clearance operations under the direct coordination of the UNMACC.  
 
The work of the MACC SL after July 2006 did not go unnoticed. The UN awarded the the 
UNMACC the UN 21 commendation for excellence and outstanding work.
18
 The UNHCR 
also awarded the UNMACC the 2008 Nansen Refugee Award for its rapid response to 
the 2006 crisis and for taking the lead in clearing cluster munitions. The UNHCR press 
release on the Nansen Award did not mention the role the LAF or LMAC had had in the 
removal of over 145,000 submunitions. The LMAC does not mention these awards in its 
presentations to stakeholders about the period either. Nevertheless, all LMAC 
personnel embedded at the MACC SL received certificates recognising their important 
role and contribution to the overall success of the MACC SL. Additionally, there is no 
record indicating that national government officials attended the award ceremonies in 
Tyre or in Geneva.  
  
In 2007, the Lebanese Cabinet revised the 1998 mine action policy to reflect the events 
of 2006. It issued Decree 10 /2007 that replaced the NDO with LMAC, placing it under 
the command of the deputy chief of staff for operations of the LAF in charge of all 
aspects of mine action. The policy stated that, “The LMAC shall task, coordinate and 
authorise all humanitarian demining related activities including landmine and ERW 
survey, mapping, marking, clearance and land recovery.”  
 
The policy intended to strengthen LMAC, which would be responsible for: 
• accreditation 
• quality control and quality assurance 
• the management of the database 
                                                    
17
 Area 6 is Nabatieh district north of the Litani river. Its clearance was covered under the second phase of Operation 
Emirates Solidarity which began at the end of 2006 and ended in March 2008. 
18
 The UN21 Awards were established in 1996 to recognize outstanding initiatives by individual staff members or 
teams to improve the delivery of the United Nation’s programmes and services. 
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• MRE  
• VA 
 
The policy also outlined that LMAC could seek support and collaboration from national 
and international organisations as needed. The decree stated it was LMAC’s 
responsibility to manage the mine action programme on behalf of the Lebanon Mine 
Action Authority (LMAA). The decree also authorised LMAC to solicit international and 
national assistance as needed, and describes the role and membership of the 
International Support Group (ISG), including representatives from UNDP, the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Office of the Personal Representative of the 
Security General, and ambassadors from donor countries. It states clearance operations 
will follow national standards, and it establishes monitoring guidelines. It also states 
that Lebanon planned to become a signatory of the APMBC and the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II.
19
  
 
In conjunction with the decree, the LMAC requested the UNMACC (the UN component 
of the MACC SL) to maintain its operational functions in south Lebanon and continue to 
provide technical, operational and strategic advice to the LAF Engineering Regiment and 
LMAC until the end of 2008, when LMAC would take charge of operations from a 
regional base in Nabatieh.
20
 UNMAS agreed that UNMACC would hand over a 
manageable and residual mine and ERW problem in south Lebanon and “return all 
delegated responsibilities for clearance operations” to the LMAC after 2008.” The 
memorandum of understanding between the Lebanon Ministry of Defense and UNMAS 
was not signed until October 2009, ten months after the transition occurred.
21
 
 
Also in 2007, Lebanon adopted a long term plan for 2008–2012 to reflect the impact of 
the 2006 hostilities and the planned clearance scheduled for 2007. A primary goal was 
to implement technical surveys and eliminate the impact in all high and medium 
impacted communities identified in the 2002–2003 LIS by 2011.
22
   
 
In the midst of the structural changes and the request from LMAC for the UNMACC to 
stay in south Lebanon until the end of 2008, there were signs that Lebanon was making 
significant progress in clearing cluster submunitions. UNMACC said south Lebanon 
would be impact free of all landmines and cluster munitions, excluding the Blue Line. 
The statement was repeated by the MACC SL programme manager Chris Clark in 
October 2008 in an interview available on the UNHCR website, “……….by the end of this 
                                                    
19
 National Mine Action Policy March 2007.  On 18 August 2010 Lebanon ratified the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions. As of August   
2011 Lebanon had not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. 
20
 Letter from Brig.-General Mohammed Fehmi to UNMAS, 7 May 2007. 
21
 Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of National Defense and the United Nations Mine Action 
Service, 13 October  
2010. 
22
 NDO, “Long Term Plan 2008–2012,” Beirut, p. 9. 
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year (2008) we will have addressed the unexploded cluster bomb problem to such a 
degree that it will have a negligible impact on the civilian population. They will have 
pretty much total access to their land. Anything that's left will, by and large, be in 
remote, uninhabited areas. This residue can be tackled at a slower and less urgent pace 
over the coming years.”
23
  
 
The MACC SL was responsible for resource mobilisation as well as interacting with 
international and local media. It seems some donors may have misunderstood 
statements on what MACC SL said about south Lebanon being free of all mines and 
cluster munitions by the end of 2008.  It could be argued that this misunderstanding 
was a factor that led to a decline in funding in 2009, although it cannot be discounted, 
since donors had, between 2006 – 2008, already given close to 130 million US dollars 
toward emergency clearance of south Lebanon,. A  decline in funding was inevitable, 
particularly when much of the high priority areas had been cleared.
24
 It could also be 
said that the transfer of operational responsibility from UNMACC to LMAC created an 
opportunity for donors to pull back and wait and see how operations continued without 
the UN overseeing them.  
 
For various reasons, south Lebanon was not free from the impact of cluster 
submunitions at the end of 2007 or in 2008. According to the MACC SL, poor weather 
conditions, the underestimation of the level of contamination, the unstable political 
situation and a gradual reduction in the number of clearance teams from a peak of 60 
BAC teams in 2007 to 48 in 2008 combined to prevent Lebanon from being impact free.  
 
On 1 January 2009, LMAC, through the regional mine action centre in Nabatieh, took full 
responsibility for the management of all clearance operations in the south, except for 
those conducted by UNIFIL on the Blue Line.
25
 The UN component of the MACC SL 
(UNMACC) reverted to its role as a coordination centre with UNIFIL, and relocated to 
the UNIFIL headquarters in Naqoura. At the time of the transition, the MACC SL 
reported that 47 per cent of surface clearance and 29 per cent of subsurface clearance 
had been completed.
26
 
GOVERNMENT SUPPORT TO THE PROGRAMME 
 
The mine action programme in Lebanon is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense 
                                                    
23
 Chris Clark interview, 3 October 2008, www.unhcr.org/48e620da2.html. 
24
 International funding statistics found in Landmine Monitor from 1999-2009 show that emergency funding quickly 
drops after the  
initial funding phase.  
25
 Presentations by Brig.-Gen. Mohammed Fehmi, LMAC, at the twelfth meeting of national directors and UN 
advisors, Geneva on  
24 March 2009, and to the international support group in Beirut on 14 May 2009. See also UN Security Council, 
“Ninth report of the  
Secretary-General on Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006),” S/2009/119, 3 March 2009, para. 43. 
26
 MACC SL Annual Report 2008 
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through the Lebanon Mine Action Center in Beirut and the regional mine action centre 
in Nabatieh. The centres are staffed with army personnel from the Engineer Regiment. 
The offices in Beirut and Nabatieh are located in military compounds provided by the 
Ministry of Defense. The estimated cost of the army officers and military staff in 2010 
was approximately USD 6.5 million for the year.  
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CURRENT STATUS OF THE LEBANON MINE ACTION 
PROGRAMME 
PLANNING CAPACITIES 
The Lebanon national mine action policy provides for an inter-ministerial committee to 
establish guidance and priorities for government strategic plans affecting mine action 
priorities. A consultative approach to selecting local mine clearance priorities helps 
ensure that local governance advice is incorporated into national programmes.  
 
LMAC, under the command of the deputy chief of staff for operations of the LAF, is the 
coordinating body for all mine action in Lebanon, and is responsible for implementing 
and coordinating the mine action programme.
27
 Mine clearance priorities are 
established by the LMAC and presented to the chief of operations for approval. The 
requirements for mine clearance are submitted to the LMAC by ministries and other 
sources in an ad-hoc manner. 
Since 2004, Lebanon has given increased attention to post-clearance humanitarian 
factors and socio economic development, especially in south Lebanon. UNDP, as part of 
its socio economic project based in south Lebanon, drafted project proposals in 2004 for 
the rehabilitation of areas cleared of mines, but no development projects connected 
with mine action were created in 2005 or 2006. Instead, private or commercial 
enterprises have largely developed the cleared land.
 
From 2002-2008, when the MACC SL managed the clearance operations in south 
Lebanon, it maintained the data for its area of responsibility. The data would be 
synchronised with the LMAC in Beirut on a weekly basis to ensure there was an up-to-
date national database.  
An internal LMAC SWOT analysis identifies the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats in Lebanon’s mine action programme. It cannot be stated enough that 
LMAC sees the fact that the LAF  manage the mine action programme as a major 
strength, and they possess a level of knowledge and expertise that provides credibility 
to donors and clearance operators.  
The analysis indicates that the mine action programme is a diverse combination of 
international and national support made up of military and civilian personnel. The 
weaknesses and threats are limited to funding, security and the terrain, which impacts 
the cost and speed in which clearance operations can be conducted.  
 
 
                                                    
27
 LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Center” www.lebmac.org. 
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SWOT Analysis of LMAC
28
 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Lebanon mine action programme managed by LAF Lack of funding 
Determination, knowledge and expertise Lack of under-water EOD expertise 
Good relationships between LAF and NGOs Demining equipment shortage 
Expertise of Engineer Regiment Movement of vehicles  
  EOD publications concerning TM 60 Series 
Opportunities Threats 
Different sources of funding 
Competition with other regional mine action 
programmes for resource funding 
Diverse actors Unpredictable hostilities and acts of terrorism 
UN agencies, UNIFIL troops, international and 
national NGOs, commercial companies Variation in terrain throughout Lebanon 
Gender in mine action activities; civilian employees   
DEMINING CAPACITIES 
In 2010, the number of BAC and clearance teams was far less than the 2006-2008 
period, despite the formation of two national NGOs and new funding from the 
European Commission in June 2010, which increased the number of clearance teams.  
 
In September 2009, Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD), a national 
NGO, was established. It works in partnership with the Iranian organisation, Immen 
Sazan Omran Pars (ISOP), and is funded by the government of Iran.
29
  As of July 2010, 
clearance capacity consisted of LAF, MAG, NPA, DCA, POD, DynCorp International and 
UNIFIL, and was made up of BAC, mechanical, mine clearance and EOD survey teams.  
 
After the cessation of hostilities in mid-August, and in accordance with the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL increased its demining and EOD capacities. 
Coordinating with UNIFIL, the UNMACC gained agreement from the force commander 
for EOD/BAC teams to contribute to the humanitarian clearance of cluster munitions 
and other ERW within the UNIFIL area of operations.  
 
Throughout the conflict, planning benefited from the presence of UNMAS staff in Tyre 
(southern Lebanon) and the UNDP’s chief technical advisor in Beirut. The plan focused 
on the deployment of EOD teams as well as BAC  teams to deal with the perceived 
accumulation of ERW. Since early 2010, UNIFIL has not had a BAC capacity. Its future 
role in the mine action programme is likely to be reduced when a new memorandum of 
understanding between UNFIL and the Ministry of Defense is concluded in 2011.   
 
With seed money from the US Department of State through DynCorp International, the 
                                                    
28
 LMAC Presentation 24 August 2010, Beirut. 
29
 Ibid. 
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national NGO Lebanon demining office (LDO) began to carry out non-technical surveys 
for the regional mine action centre (RMAC) in Nabatieh in August 2010, in order to 
verify information in the national mine action database.   
 
RMAC provides data on affected communities to LDO who, in turn, conducts interviews 
in the community and recommends area reduction, cancellation or clearance. The 
RMAC then follows up with appropriate  tasking. The LDO began on 1 August with four 
administrative staff and two survey teams made up of eight personnel. The organisation 
planned to establish clearance teams pending funding.
30
 The UNDP planned to continue 
providing technical assistance to LMAC through its capacity development project.
31
 
 
RMAC has three military and four civilian community liaison officers, who work on 
collecting information from impacted communities, report on incidents, and coordinate 
with the clearance operators.
32
  The NGOs and UNIFIL also have their own community 
liaison capacity, and work closely with the LMAC community liaison teams.
33
  
NATIONAL MINE ACTION STANDARDS AND QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
 
The Lebanese Mine Action Center is responsible for quality management. National mine 
action standards have been drafted, but as of August 2010 had not been approved.  
LMAC accredits all clearance teams and conducts quality assurance.  The RMAC in 
Nabatieh coordinates with the UNMACC office in Naqoura for accreditation and quality 
assurance of UNIFIL clearance operations.  
 
The NGOs have their own internal quality assurance systems, based on IMAS and 
although LMAC and RMAC assure the quality of all areas cleared, they are understaffed 
in this area.   
 
In 2010, a UNDP quality management technical advisor made recommendations for 
changes in quality assurance policies with LMAC and RMAC to improve operational 
procedures and efficiencies with its limited resources.  
                                                    
30
 Interview with DynCorp International, Beirut, 26 August 2010 
31
 Interview with UNDP, Beirut, 31 August 2010 
32
 RMAC Presentation, Nabatieh, 25 August 2010 
33
 Interviews with NGOs in Tyre, 27 August 2010 
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HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT TO THE MINE ACTION 
PROGRAMME 
NATIONAL CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT34 
The roles, responsibilities and relationships in mine action between the UN and national 
authorities are described in Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations 
Interagency Policy, released in 1999. It includes the subject of capacity development 
support in the context of transferring management responsibility from the UN to the 
national authorities. 
 
UNMAS, since 2002, and UNDP, since 2003, have provided parallel capacity 
development which includes: 
  
• formal courses 
• on-the-job training  
• the provision of technical expertise and equipment  
 
The aim was to consolidate the capacity of the national authorities to a level where the 
UN can withdraw, and the national authorities can manage the programme to 
international standards.  
 
The UNDP ‘capacity building for mine action centre’ project was put in place in 2001, 
but only began its work in 2003 due to resistance from national authorities. Since 2004, 
it has boasted significant achievements, including providing technical assistance for the 
adoption of: 
 
(a) a planning system incorporating the ESS  for Mine Action in Lebanon (ESS)  
(b) a long term five year (2008-2012) plan  
(c) an annual integrated work plan  
(d) an annual report  
 
UNDP also supported the management of clearances beyond the national capacity with 
national staff embedded with the RMAC. However, from 2002 until the end of its 
mandate in 2010, it mainly focused on training LMAC personnel.  
 
When Israeli forces withdrew from south Lebanon, and OES started  in 2002, the UNDP 
capacity development programme began providing technical assistance and UNMACC 
assumed operational responsibilities.  
 
                                                    
34
 This section is based on UNMACC Annual Reports 2001-2008, www.mineaction.org; End State Strategy and Long 
Term Plan 2008- 
2012; http://www.lebmac.org and LMAC, Transition Strategy – south Lebanon 2008 and 2009, 19 August 2008. 
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From 2002, UNDP sponsored or offered training courses to LMAC personnel, and 
UNMAS to the MACC SL staff. These were humanitarian mine action training courses 
and included:  
 
• survey 
• demining 
• sampling 
• battle area clearance 
• community liaison 
• quality assurance 
• EOD 
• GIS 
• management, including financial management and English language  
 
Several of the current officers at LMAC have attended training courses at James 
Madison University in the United States and Cranfield University in the UK. Table 1 
below lists the training offered since 2002. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Training Courses offered to LMAC personnel by UNMAS and 
UNDP 2002-2010 
 
Training Topic Year Agency 
Trains and certifies six LAF quality assurance staff 2002 UNMAS 
Trains a ten-person sampling team; leads to accreditation in technical survey and 
demining 
2002 UNMAS 
One LAF officer accredited as a MACC SL operations officer 2003 UNMAS 
MDD  and deminer training programme  2003 UNDP 
Medical, demining and explosive ordnance disposal 2003 UNDP 
One LAF officer accredited as a MACC SL planning officer 2004 UNMAS 
Humanitarian mine action 2004 UNDP 
Two humanitarian demining courses 2004 UNDP 
Two EOD l courses 2004 UNDP 
Three LAF officers accredited as MACC SL QA officers 2005 UNMAS 
LAF Engineer Regiment taught introductory course in mine action operations and 
planning 
2005 UNMAS 
Mine action senior managers course  2006 UNDP 
Mine action middle manager course 2006 UNDP 
Mine action senior managers course  2007 UNDP 
GIS training 2007 UNDP 
Two EOD l courses 2007 UNDP 
Six English language courses 2007 UNDP 
Financial management 2007 UNDP 
Three LAF officers receive on-the-job training as QA/Operations/Planning officers 2007 UNMAS 
Nine LAF soldiers trained on battle area clearance, technical survey, sampling, 
provision of mine detectors, PPE, tools, EOD, survey equipment and one vehicle 
to the team 
2007 UNMAS 
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Five LAF soldiers received on-the-job-training as community liaison officers 2007 UNMAS 
Trained LAF Engineering Regiment, LMAC and demining organisations on IMSMA 2002-2007 UNMAS 
16 GIS training courses 2008 UNDP 
Two EOD courses 2008 UNDP 
Five English language  courses 2008 UNDP 
Certified management accounting 2008 UNDP 
Nine GIS training courses 2009 UNDP 
Two EOD l courses 2009 UNDP 
Three English language courses 2009 UNDP 
Two microsoft training courses 2009 UNDP 
Four EOD  courses 2010 UNDP 
 
Lebanon’s programme is nationally managed, with continuing UN support. In addition 
to the capacity development project, UNDP has supported LMAC’s institutional 
development since 2001. Support has been given via the provision of an international 
technical advisor, equipment and national information technology and administration 
staff.  
The chief technical advisor, based at LMAC in Beirut, appears on the LMAC 
organisational chart as an advisor to the director.  The project was expanded to support 
the handover of operational responsibility in south Lebanon from UNMACC to LMAC. It 
aims to: 
 
• increase LMAC’s managerial capacity, through a policy-based mine action 
programme  
• finalise national standards 
• complete the national technical survey, in order to: 
o accurately quantify the landmine problem 
o determine priorities transparently, based on the LIS   
o get technical survey results and socio economic and gender factors 
• develop a resource mobilisation strategy 
   
The LAF personnel receive training in demining as members of the Engineer Regiment. 
The training for officers includes courses on EOD and explosives, usually in the United 
States, France and the UK. The army does not train its personnel in IMSMA. Since 2002, 
the national database has been managed by national university graduates, with a 
background in computer sciences. It is paid for by the UN, and technical support and 
training is provided by the GICHD. With the army’s long term plan of employing only 
military personnel at LMAC and RMAC, it trains its officers in databases.   
The objectives of the 2005 and 2006 integrated work plans included:  
• supervision, coordination and quality assurance of clearance tasks implemented 
by demining operators such as the army’s Engineer Regiment, NGOs and 
commercial companies  
 20 
 
• technical survey to further identify mine problems and as a process of area 
reduction of suspected areas identified through the LIS
 
 
The 2006 plan also included clearance and verification of minefields in areas needed for 
specific development projects (the roads from Marjeyoum to Nabatieh, from Tyre to 
Naqoura Road as well as the dam in Ebi-Essaqi). Marking of all areas requiring clearance 
was due to be completed in 2006. 
The 2008-2009 transition strategy for south Lebanon included both professional and 
informal capacity development opportunities for the LAF personnel. A major part of the 
capacity development activities included the training and accreditation of: 
 
• one LAF BAC team (nine soldiers), who were tasked with sampling of cleared 
BAC sites  
• on-the-job training for four LAF soldiers in community liaison 
• on-the-job training for three LAF officers on quality assurance, operations, 
planning and IMSMA 
• attendance at the five-week senior management training course at James 
Madison University  
• training two officers from LMAC in quality assurance  
 
The European Commission funded an LIS and the GICHD provided IMSMA with software 
and technical support to establish a national landmine database. The US supported the 
NDO with training and equipment in 1998, and paid for the construction of the regional 
mine action centre in Nabatieh in 2008. 
 
The UN still plays a key advisory role in Lebanon. In August 2010, building on the success 
of the 2003 - 2010 ‘Capacity Building for Mine Action Centre’ project, the UNDP 
renewed its support to Lebanon’s mine action programme by launching the ‘Support to 
Lebanon Mine Action Programme- Phase II’ project.  
 
Expected to run until the end of 2012, the project currently supports the national mine 
action programme through the development of the Lebanon Mine Action Center and 
the RMAC. The project supports by improving quality management norms, in order to 
enhance both entities’ capacity to manage all pillars of mine action, according to 
international and national standards. 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
 
Between 2000 and 2009, Lebanon received USD 239 million from international 
donors.
35 
Between 2005 and 2009 it received USD 152 million, an amount surpassed 
only by Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan in the same five-year period. In 2009 Lebanon 
                                                    
35
 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, www.the-monitor.org 
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ranked sixth among recipients of international mine action funding, having received 
USD 21 million from 12 donors.
36
 
 
After the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000, international donors, led 
by the United Arab Emirates, contributed over USD 60 million to clear mines. After the 
July - August 2006 hostilities, 20 international donors contributed almost USD 100 
million over a two-year period. This was given via various mechanisms, including the 
mine action component of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon’s (UNIFIL) 
peacekeeping assessed budget, and the UNMAS Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in 
Mine Action (VTF). The UNDP also provided funding support to civilian personnel at the 
RMAC in Nabatieh. 
 
When hostilities ceased in mid-August 2006, and in accordance with the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1701, UNIFIL increased its troop numbers. As part of this expansion, 
UNIFIL increased its demining and EOD capacities. In 2011, the level of UNIFIL 
involvement in mine action was being negotiated with the UNIFIL and the Ministry of 
Defense. 
 
The 2008-2012 long term plan clearly states the government of Lebanon does not have 
the resources needed to achieve the goals of the plan, nor is it likely to allocate funds 
from the national budget for mine action.  
 
Since the beginning of the mine action programme in 2000, Lebanon has had two 
humanitarian crises related to landmines, ERW and cluster munitions. The Lebanese 
government, through the Ministry of Defense, assigns military personnel to LMAC and 
RMAC, and provides facilities in Beirut. In 2009, the estimated value of the in-kind 
support was USD 6.5 million. 
 
 
Summary of International Contributions: 2000-200937 
 
Year International 
contributions  USD 
2009 21,210,203 
2008 27,768,536 
2007 28,338,812 
2006 68,845,934 
2005 6,300,000 
2004 13,600,000 
2003 5,900,000 
2002 5,227,000 
2001 61,473,699 
                                                    
36
 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2010, www.the-monitor.org 
37
 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2001-2010; www.the-monitor.org. 
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2000 1,300,000 
Total 239,964,184 
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP 
 
The transition of operational responsibility in south Lebanon from UNMACC in Tyre to 
the RMAC in Nabatieh took place over a 24-month period in 2007-2008, with the 
handover on 1 January 2009. Key components of the transition included: 
 
• a new national mine action policy from the government of Lebanon in May 2006 
describing the mandate of LMAC 
• a memorandum of understanding between LMAC and UNMAS 
• a UN transition officer to coordinate the process 
• a transition strategy with milestones,  
• financial commitments from UNMAS to purchase needed equipment 
• handover vehicles  
• one year funding for the civilian support staff moving from Tyre to Nabatieh  
• UNDP support to fund the civilian staff in Nabatieh from 2010-2012 
TRANSITION PLANNING
38
 
In February 2007, the MACC SL hired a transition officer who, in April 2007, presented 
LMAC with a transition discussion paper for comments and review. The paper was 
drafted based on the transition process in Kosovo.  
 
The 7 February 2008 memorandum of understanding between the LMAC and UNMAS 
reaffirmed their commitment to working together to clear ERW throughout south 
Lebanon.  It included a commitment to a transition process from UNMACC to LMAC, 
beginning in January 2009 when “the LMAC would resume full responsibility for all 
humanitarian clearance operations throughout south Lebanon.” The UNMACC would 
then reduce its capacity and remain only in the role of providing direct support to 
UNIFIL clearance operations. 
 
In April 2008, UNMACC and LMAC devised a transition plan that consisted of three key 
documents and focused on the development and operations of the RMAC and the 
implementation of capacity development initiatives. The transition had three goals: 
 
 
1. Develop a results-oriented plan to assist LMAC in achieving its end-state strategy 
2. Minimise future risks to ensure the implementation is final and the LAF has the 
capacity to manage clearance operations in south Lebanon. 
3. Continue supporting LMAC in meeting its goals described in the long term plan 
and the end-state strategy. 
 
                                                    
38
 Interviews with LMAC and UNMACC; and  UNMACC and LMAC Transition Strategy  - South Lebanon 2008-2009, 31 
October 2008. 
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The transition would divide the joint LAF – UN structure at the MACC SL:  
 
• The LAF would go to the RMAC and the UN component (UNMACC) to UNIFIL in 
Naquora, to support UNIFIL clearance and EOD assets  
 
• The LAF officers working at the MACC SL would become part of the new LAF-
operated RMAC  
 
The UN also supported the transition, by providing capital equipment and technical 
advisors at the RMAC in 2009. 
 
LMAC and the UNMACC drew up a “to do” list of activities and responsibilities, with 
deadlines to achieve them, partially based on a questionnaire to the stakeholders from 
the MACC SL transition officer. UNMACC and LMAC also conducted a risk assessment of 
the transition, which itself was interrupted by events in Lebanon in 2008 that led to a 
shortage of LAF staff at RMAC.  RMAC provided UNMACC with a detailed list of what 
was needed to operate a mine action centre. The transition involved a large transfer of 
equipment to RMAC. At the transition, UNMACC provided or purchased vehicles, 
demining equipment, computers, communications equipment, office supplies, plotters 
and office furniture. 
 
 
Table 2: Transition Plan Activities and Responsibilities 
Activity Responsibility Deadline 
Draft initial transition strategy with LMAC MACC SL transition officer, with 
supervision from the MACC SL 
programme manager 
1 May 2008 
Draft a staffing plan, with terms of reference 
for each position and starting date 
LAF representative at MACC SL 1 May 2008 
LMAC makes decision on type of 
communication system it will use at RMAC 
LMAC Director 1 May 2008 
MACC SL and LMAC revise the National 
Technical Standards and Guidelines; 
UNMACC provides funding to translate them 
into Arabic. 
LMAC QA officer and MACC SL 
head of QA section 
No deadline set 
Conduct first meeting on transition strategy LAF representative at MACC SL 15 May 2008 
Finalise transition strategy LAF representative at MACC SL 
and transition officer 
May 30, 2008 
UNMACC to submit equipment list to LMAC 
on what it will provide to RMAC 
MACC SL transition officer June 1 , 2008 
LMAC identifies positions at RMAC to be 
held by the military and to be held by 
civilians 
LAF representative at MACC SL June 1 , 2008 
LMAC trained on MACC SL information 
management system 
LMAC IT chief, supported by 
MACC SL programme 
information officer  
Ongoing 
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Meeting to identify resource gaps LMAC chief of operations 
supported by UNDP CTA 
July 2008 
LMAC makes formal request to MACC SL for 
current staff to move to RMAC 
LMAC director 1 July 2008 
Decision on LAF communications system LMAC director 15 July 2008 
LAF confirms military staff including two new 
officers to be assigned to RMAC 
LAF representative at MACC SL July 2008 
UNMACC informs LMAC which civilian 
positions it can support 
MACC SL programme manager 1 August 2008 
UNMACC, DynCorp International, UNDP and 
LMAC place initial equipment in RMAC 
MACC SL finance/admin officer; 
MACC SL logistics officer; MACC 
SL transition officer; DynCorp 
international programme 
manager; UNDP CTA 
Delayed until funding 
was assured 
LMAC places two new officers at RMAC and 
both are trained at MACC SL 
LAF rep at MACC SL;  15 August – 30 
September 2008 
UNMACC provides remaining equipment to 
RMAC 
MACC SL finance/admin officer; 
MACC SL logistics officer; 
supervised by MACC SL 
programme manager 
By 9 January 2009 
UNMACC ensures all equipment is working MACC SL finance/admin officer; 
MACC SL logistics officer; 
supervised by MACC SL 
programme manager 
By 9 January 2009 
 
The transition plan included a risk assessment. It identified factors and scenarios that 
could disrupt the transition, as well as affect the mine action programme afterwards. 
The transition was affected in 2008 when the political and security situation in Lebanon 
deteriorated, and the LAF was unable to assign new officers to mine action. LAF 
priorities in the north of Lebanon ultimately led LMAC to request a one year delay in the 
transition, from January 2008 to January 2009.  
 
There were risks not associated with the security and the political situation. The LAF 
lacked resources including personnel, which could cause RMAC to lose effectiveness or 
the ability to carry out its mandate to international standards. The LAF ordered that the 
required number of officers be assigned to RMAC and UNMACC agreed to fund  civilian 
staff for 12 months, followed by three year funding from UNDP. The long term plan is 
for the LAF to staff the RMAC with only military personnel. In Lebanon there is a 
continual fear that Israel could attack again and re-contaminate the area. 
SUCCESS OF TRANSITION PROCESS 
 
The transition, or handover of operational responsibility, took place as planned on  
1 January 2009, when the LAF moved equipment and furniture to Nabatieh. The 
transition is considered an overwhelming success by all involved, although there were 
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hitches in the logistics, such as the lack of water and electricity at RMAC
39
 which 
required the construction of temporary latrines. Eventually UNDP paid for the 
infrastructure, and by mid-June 2010 the facility had water and electricity.  
 
Another hitch was how, because of UNDP regulations
40
, the civilian staff contracts 
expired after one year and each staff member had to reapply for his or her position, 
resulting in a gap of two months when they did not go to work.  
 
Overall, however, the transition went smoothly, largely because the key RMAC staff had 
been with the MACC SL for several years, knew their job, and were ready to take 
responsibility for the mine action programme in south Lebanon. 
 
 
 
                                                    
39
 The US State Department had constructed the RMAC facility in Nabatieh but did not include the water and 
infrastructure as part of 
the project and neither UNDP nor UNMAS had sufficient funds to build the infrastructure. The LAF base at Nabatieh is 
heavily  
damaged from Israeli bombing. 
40
 They were considered new hires. 
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LESSONS LEARNED 
 
1) As a critical first step in planning an assessment of all stakeholders’ preparedness 
and commitment to the transition process is required   
 
The MACC SL transition programme officer developed questionnaires and discussion 
papers at the beginning of 2007, which led to identifying a number of previously 
unexamined risks that ultimately led to the postponement of the transition from 2008 
to 2009, in order to further plan and build capacity. The LMAC subsequently formally 
requested the UN component of the MACC SL to remain and continue its mine action 
coordination functions for south Lebanon. 
 
 
2) A dedicated transition officer enables quality planning and implementation of a 
transition plan and maintains the momentum of the transition process. 
 
The MACC SL transition programme officer played a key role in planning and 
coordinating the transition and instilled the importance of the transition into the 
stakeholders.  
 
The appointment of the UNMACC transition programme officer in February 2007 was 
critical in the preparation of key documents detailing the terms and conditions of the 
transition, as well as finalising a transition strategy amenable to all stakeholders.  A key 
task was determining the equipment available for transfer to RMAC, and what was not 
available in Lebanon and had to be purchased on the international market. The transfer 
and purchase of equipment proved to be problematic.   
 
 
3) It is essential to develop a detailed logistical plan and identify potential delays and 
mitigation strategies.  
 
A risk assessment and mitigation plan were a central part of the development of the 
transition strategy, although the risk assessment focused primarily on political and 
operational risks, rather than logistical and financial risks.  
 
In hindsight, gaps in logistics and financial planning may have been averted if the 
UNMAS programme officer in New York and the UNOPS portfolio manager had been 
more closely involved in the planning, and had mitigated the delays in moving from the 
UNMACC to the RMAC, which occurred on New Years’ Day 2009 when UN staff were on 
leave.  
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4) A trial period before the full handover should be part of the transition, in order to 
identify operational problems to be corrected.  
 
UNMACC suggested the transition be tested through a four-month trial period in which 
the LAF officers would relocate to Nabatieh six months in advance of the actual 
transition in order to test the systems and, if necessary, make adjustments before the 
transition occurred. However, this trial period never took place, because of logistical 
and financial complications regarding the transfer of equipment, and also the building in 
Nabatieh at the LAF base was not ready for use; in January 2009 it still lacked water and 
electricity.  
 
This impacted communications and information management as well as general 
working conditions, as temporary latrines had to be constructed. RMAC had no running 
water for months. The UNMACC and the RMAC-N adapted accordingly to this situation 
but have highlighted that solving these problems during a trial period in which they did 
not impact on operations would have been better.  
 
 
5) A transition plan should describe the post-transition relationship between 
stakeholders.  
 
The post-transition relationship between the LMAC, RMAC, UNMACC and UNIFIL took a 
significant period of time to negotiate and finalise. This took the form of a 
memorandum of understanding, which described in detail the operational 
management, coordination and liaison between the various agencies.  This document 
was not finalised and signed until October 2009, some ten months after the transition. 
Ideally a memorandum of understanding should be negotiated before the transition 
occurs. 
 
 
6) A mine action structure after the transition should be based on the available 
resources of the national authority rather than a generic structure, assuming the same 
resources are available as under the UN structure.  
 
The resource limitations of the Ministry of Defense are well known. One of the reasons 
why international support has been critical to the mine action programme in Lebanon 
since its inception is the size of the Engineer Regiment and the number of personnel the 
LAF  can allocate to mine action.  
 
Until the number of cluster submunition and minefield sites have been reduced, in 
addition to a parallel reduction in RMAC staff, international resources will be required. 
In its role of building capacity, the UN should advise on a structure appropriate for the 
available resources. 
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One of the shortcomings of a military-run mine action programme is that regular staff 
rotations result in a loss of skills and knowledge among the mine action team. Also, it 
takes time for new personnel to learn processes, procedures and the programme.  The 
Lebanon mine action programme is no exception to these inherent impediments. The 
government of Lebanon’s ESS, approved in 2004, recognised this shortcoming and 
included use of international and civilian personnel expertise as needed, as part of the 
strategy in achieving a mine impact free state.  
 
Although, at the time of this study in August 2010, LMAC had a very experienced officer 
corps managing the programme in both Beirut and Nabatieh, the three-year rotation 
schedule creates staff turnover, which affects at least the momentum of clearance 
operations.  
 
Staff rotations at RMAC and the unexpected redeployment of staff to meet other 
defence needs in Lebanon sometimes delay quality assurance or slow down operations, 
as new staff become acquainted with procedures.  
 
Overall, the rotation of staff was viewed as an inherent but manageable problem rather 
than a detriment to the programme. 
 
 
7) Transparency and regularity in reporting are critical aspects to a mine action 
programme. One significant difference in the mine action programme since the 
transition in January 2009 is the frequency in reporting on achievements and the 
remaining contamination. 
 
From 2006 to 2008, the MACC SL produced monthly and annual reports, funding 
updates and analysis, and managed a website, www.maccsl.org.  The website is no 
longer operational though its reports are still available at www.mineaction.org.   
 
Since January 2009, reporting on the mine action programme has been reduced to 
presentations at international meetings related to the APMBC and the CCM. While 
LMAC operates its own website, it is not up-to-date and it contains no current data or 
detail comparable to what was available in the MACC SL reports. The lack of regular 
reporting, combined with LMAC’s tight control over data, is a weak point in the post-
transition period.  
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